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ABSTRACT
         This paper examines the extent of redistribution that would occur under various annuity and
bequest options as part of an individual accounts retirement program.  I first estimate mortality
differentials by gender, race, ethnicity and level of education using the National Longitudinal
Mortality Study and document substantial differences.  I then use these estimates to examine the
“expected transfers” that would take place between socioeconomic groups under different
assumptions about the structure of an annuity program.  Using an expected present discounted
value or “money’s worth” calculation as the basis for comparison, I find that the size of transfers
in an individual accounts program is highly sensitive to the benefit structure.  For example,
mandating a single-life, real annuity can result in expected transfers of as high as 20% of the
account balance, often from economically disadvantaged groups toward groups that are better off.
These transfers can be substantially reduced through the use of joint life annuities, survivor
provisions and bequest options.  For example, the largest expected negative transfer under a joint
and full survivor annuity with a fully valued 20-year guarantee option is only 2% of the account
balance.  However, efforts to reduce the extent of redistribution generally do so at the cost of
significantly lower annuity benefits paid to the individuals who contribute to the system. 
Jeffrey R. Brown
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Numerous proposals have emerged for supplementing or partially replacing the current 
U.S. Social Security system with a system of mandatory individual savings accounts.  These 
accounts are designed to be like defined contribution pension plans, in that each individual 
would contribute a fraction of annual earnings into a retirement savings account.  Upon reaching 
retirement, the individual would have accumulated a potentially large stock of wealth from 
which to finance consumption in the remaining years of life.  Under such a system, a retired 
individual faces the problem of choosing a consumption path financed by the assets accumulated 
in the individual account, without incurring too great a risk of outliving available resources.  One 
way to avoid this risk is to purchase a life annuity contract, which promises a stream of income 
for as long as the policyholder is alive. 
This paper examines the distributional implications of alternative annuity options within 
a mandatory retirement savings system.  Distributional considerations arise from heterogeneity in 
mortality risk across the population, as life annuities are structured to transfer unused resources 
of early decedants to longer-lived individuals.  For purposes of this paper, transfers from shorter-
lived to longer-lived individuals should not, in and of themselves, be considered “redistribution.”  
If everyone experienced the same risk of dying at each age, then every individual would have an 
equal chance of being the survivor, and thus an annuity would not redistribute in expectation.  
Rather, the ex-post transfers that would occur would simply be carrying out the very function of 
an annuity market.      
This paper focuses on the redistribution that arises from differences in the expected 
transfers between particular demographic groups in an individual accounts system as a result of 
systemic mortality differences.  Heterogeneity in mortality means that annuities which ignore 
individual or group characteristics will result in expected transfers away from high-mortality risk   2 
groups to low-mortality risk groups.  The “groups” considered in this paper are differentiated by 
gender, race, Hispanic status, and level of education.  I show that mortality rates differ 
substantially across these groups and that this leads to quite different valuations of annuities.  I 
also demonstrate that the size of the expected transfers is quite sensitive to the specific design of 
the annuity program. 
The extent of redistribution depends on how both the accumulation phase and the payout 
phase are designed.  In the accumulation phase, the key question is whether or not to allow pre-
retirement bequests.  The probability of a 22-year old dying prior to retirement age and thus 
leaving a bequest were one permitted is very high for certain demographic groups.  For example, 
while 20% of all 22-year old men in the year 2000 will die prior to reaching age 67, this 
probability is as high as 41.2% for black males with less than a high school education, and as low 
as 13.1% for college educated white males.  Therefore, even though lifetime earnings will be 
much lower for poorly educated black males, the expected discounted value of bequests for this 
group is 56% larger than it is for college educated white males.    
Assuming an individual survives to retirement age, there are numerous dimensions along 
which the payout phase can be designed, including the structure of the payment trajectory, the 
number of lives covered, and what survivor and bequest options are included.  Results indicate 
that the degree of redistribution that occurs within an individual accounts system is quite 
sensitive to the specific structure of this payout phase.  Mandating the use of a single life, 
inflation indexed annuity leads to very substantial transfers from men to women, from blacks to 
whites and Hispanics, and from lower education groups to higher ones.  The size of these 
expected transfers can be significantly reduced through the use of joint and survivor annuities, 
period certain or refund options, or by “front-loading” annuity payments.  However, the   3 
mechanisms that lessen the extent of redistribution often do so at the expense of insurance 
provision.  The way to reduce the impact of mortality differentials is to lessen the importance of 
mortality in the calculation of benefits.  Period certain and refund options do this, but at the 
expense of providing a lower level of monthly income.  In the extreme, one could completely 
eliminate redistribution by foregoing annuitization entirely.  However, to do so would be to 
forego the potentially large welfare gains that arise from access to annuitization.   
This paper is organized as follows.  Section 1 examines the impact of gender, race, and 
educational status on mortality risk.  The relevant literature on differential mortality is reviewed, 
and then new estimates are presented which use the National Longitudinal Mortality Study.  
Section 2 discusses the accumulation phase of an annuity, with particular focus on how 
differential mortality affects the decision of whether to allow for pre-retirement bequests.  
Section 3 examines the “money’s worth” of annuities for each demographic group under several 
different assumptions about how the payout phase is designed, including real annuities, nominal 
annuities, period certain options, joint life products, and refund options.  I also discuss 
implications for variable annuity design, as well as the impact of partial or delayed annuitization.  
Section 4 provides a brief discussion of how the results change if we loosen the constraint that all 
individuals face the same price.  Section 5 concludes.     
  
1.  Mortality Differentials by Gender, Race, and Education 
1.1 Previous Literature on Differential Mortality 
  At least since the influential study by Kitagawa and Hauser (1973), it has been known 
that mortality differs across socioeconomic groups in the U.S.  In addition to documenting the 
significant differences in mortality across racial lines, Kitagawa and Hauser found differences   4 
along educational and income margins.  One of their most cited findings is that mortality varied 
inversely with the level of educational attainment.  They found that for those aged 25 to 64, this 
inverse and monotonic relationship between years of schooling and mortality existed for all race 
and sex classes.  
  In the years following this study, the literature on differential mortality has grown 
rapidly, and as such I will not attempt to provide a comprehensive review of this literature.
1 
Rather, I focus on what the literature has found with respect to four factors – gender, race, 
ethnicity and measures of economic status – that form the basis for the analysis that follows. 
1.1.1  Gender 
  It is well known that mortality rates of females are lower than those of males.  This 
differential exists at all ages in the U.S., leading to significant differences in life expectancy for 
men and women.  The cohort used in this paper, those turning age 22 in the year 2000, had a life 
expectancy at birth (in 1978) of 75.5 years for males and 82.1 years for females.  To account for 
these differences in the analysis that follows, estimation of mortality rates will be done for males 
and females separately. 
1.1.2  Race & Hispanic Status 
  Racial and ethnic differences in mortality also exist, though there is controversy about the 
precise nature of these differences.  It is generally agreed that mortality rates of blacks are higher 
than that of whites at all ages below 75, for both men and women.  However, a number of studies 
have reported that there exists a mortality “crossover” between blacks and whites at older ages, 
meaning that black mortality rates fall below those of whites at older ages (Sorlie et al, 1992).   
Yet other authors have concluded that the racial crossover does not exist, but rather is a result of  
                                                            
1 Readers interested in a more complete review of the literature should consult Feinstein (1993).   5 
“serious errors and inconsistencies in the data on which national estimates of African-American 
mortality at older ages are based” (Preston et al 1996).  The ages reported on death certificates 
appear to be systematically younger than those reported in the U.S. Census.  As a result, when 
researchers correct for this misreporting bias, the racial crossover in mortality disappears.  If the 
racial crossover exists before or shortly after retirement, it is potentially important for 
understanding how blacks fare relative to whites under alternative annuitization schemes.  While 
resolving this conflict is beyond the scope of this paper, I find little evidence of racial crossover 
in the data and therefore make no corrections in the analysis that follows. 
   While research on the mortality experience of Hispanics is more limited, available 
evidence suggests that U.S. Hispanics have lower mortality rates than non-Hispanic whites, 
despite a greater proportion of Hispanics living in poverty, lacking health insurance, and having 
more limited access to health care (Sorlie, et al 1993).  Hispanics tend to have lower rates of 
heart disease, cancer, and pulmonary disease, though these differences do not seem to be 
explained by the major known risk factors for these diseases, suggesting perhaps a genetic or 
biological explanation.  However, there are several reasons to suspect that some of the observed 
difference is not real, but rather due to sampling bias.  For example, if sampling techniques tend 
to under-sample less healthy Hispanics (e.g., migrant farm workers), this would bias mortality 
rates down.  In addition, studies like the National Longitudinal Mortality Study used in this paper 
obtain mortality information by linking to the National Death Index.  This means that deaths 
outside of the U.S. are not recorded in the NDI, and therefore some individuals’ deaths will be 
missed.  One researcher has labeled this effect the “Salmon bias,” due to the “compulsion to die 
in one’s birthplace” leading to a bias in mortality rates (Pablos-Mendez 1994).  In the NLMS 
data, I find that mortality rates for Hispanic women are, in fact, significantly lower than those for   6 
white women at most ages.  For Hispanic men, the data indicates that mortality rates tend to be 
slightly higher than for white men at most ages. 
  It should also be noted that there is substantial heterogeneity within the Hispanic 
population.  Of particular importance is the fact that foreign-born persons tend to have lower 
mortality risk than native-born persons.  (Sorlie, et al, 1993).  Because a large fraction of the 
U.S. Hispanic population is foreign born, this “healthy migrant effect” may partially explain the 
lower mortality rates among Hispanics.  Projecting forward, if native-born segment of the U.S. 
Hispanic population increases as a share of the total Hispanic population, these mortality 
differentials may decrease.   
1.1.3  Economic Status 
  A third factor that is significantly correlated with mortality is an individual’s economic 
status.  The evidence suggests that individuals who are in a higher socioeconomic group tend to 
live longer.  There is, however, no definitive way to measure these effects.  Three measures of 
economic status are used in the literature, namely education, income, and wealth, and each is 
subject to its own limitations.
2  
   A significant negative correlation between education and mortality is nearly always 
found (Kitawaga & Hauser 1973, Deaton & Paxson 1999, Lantz et al 1998).  This could be due 
to the fact that education serves as a rough proxy for lifetime earnings, and hence picks up the 
fact that people with more resources tend to live longer.  On the other hand, there could be a very 
direct effect of education on mortality, if for example, more highly educated individuals better 
understand the risks of certain behaviors and avoid them as a result.  In this paper, I will use 
education as the only proxy for lifetime resources.  This choice is driven in part by a belief that 
                                                            
2 Smith (1999) provides an excellent discussion of the issues involved in understanding these relationships.   7 
education is a better proxy for lifetime resources than other measures, and in part by necessity – 
the NLMS income data are of questionable value, and wealth data do not exist. 
  A second widely used indicator of economic status is a measure of individual or family 
current income.  Again, a significant negative correlation between income and mortality is 
universally found (for example, Kitawaga & Hauser 1973, Hadley & Osei 1982, Lantz et al 
1998, Kaplan 1996, Deaton & Paxson 1999).  In fact, many of these studies indicate that income 
and education have independent effects.  However, current income is a poor measure of lifetime 
resources for several reasons.  The most important criticism of this approach is the problem of 
simultaneous causation between income and health.  Low-income individuals are more likely to 
suffer from health problems and thus experience higher mortality rates.  But it is also true that 
individuals in poor health may be unable to earn a high income, in which case the causality of 
the relationship is reversed.  As a result, it is quite difficult to provide any causal interpretation to 
the coefficient in a simple regression of mortality rates on current income.     
  A third measure of socioeconomic status that is used in the literature is wealth.  Attanasio 
& Hoynes (1995), Menchik (1993), and Palmer (1989) all provide compelling evidence that 
wealth and mortality are inversely correlated.  The use of wealth partially addresses the 
simultaneity problem that arises when using current income, since presumably wealth 
accumulation is less affected by health problems.  However, as noted by Attanasio & Hoynes 
(1995), wealth cannot be considered a purely exogenous variable, both because of correlation 
with health, and because wealth accumulation behavior of individuals with different life 
expectancies could be different.      8 
1.2  Previous Literature on Social Security and Differential Mortality 
  The importance of differential mortality has not gone unnoticed in the economics 
literature, especially with regard to its impact on Social Security.  It has long been recognized 
that high income individuals might receive relatively higher benefits relative to taxes paid than 
low income individuals if they have a higher life expectancy.  A spate of recent studies (Liebman 
1999, Panis & Lillard 1996, Duggan et al 1995, and Garrett 1995) have investigated the 
progressivity of the existing Social Security benefit system making use of mortality differences 
by economic factors.  These authors agree that there are significant correlations between 
measures of economic well-being and mortality.  However, while authors such as Garrett find 
that mortality differences are sufficient to eliminate the progressive returns, Duggan et al 
conclude that the effect of income on mortality is not sufficient to overturn the progressivity.     
All of the aforementioned papers have focused primarily on the impact of differential 
mortality on the existing Social Security system.  However, these have limited applicability in 
quantifying the distributional impact of an individual accounts system.  There are at least three 
distinct factors that affect the progressivity of the current system – a regressive payroll tax, a 
progressive benefit formula, and differential mortality.  Most of the proposed individual account 
programs do not involve progressive benefit formulas, and so the potentially regressive effects of 
differential mortality may have a much more direct impact on such a system.  This paper, along 
with recent work by Feldstein & Liebman (2000, this volume), is among the first papers to 
explore the implications of mortality differentials within the specific context of an individual 
account system.     9 
1.3  Estimates of Differential Mortality Using the NLMS 
Rather than piecing together estimates of the impact of gender, race, and economic status 
on mortality from several disparate sources, this paper uses new estimates from the National 
Longitudinal Mortality Survey.  The NLMS is a survey of individuals who were originally 
included in the Current Population Survey and/or the Census in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  
Throughout the 1980s, death certificate information from the National Death Index was merged 
back into the survey data, allowing researchers to compare the death rates of individuals on the 
basis of demographic characteristics at the time of the interview. 
I construct age-specific mortality estimates from the NLMS based on gender, race, 
ethnicity, and educational attainment.
3  I first construct separate mortality rates for black, white, 
and Hispanic males and females, a total of 6 groups.  I then further differentiate whites and 
blacks into three education groups, namely less than high school, high school plus up to three 
years of college, and college graduates.  Due to small sample sizes, it is not possible to 
differentiate Hispanics along educational lines.  While the NLMS data does include a measure of 
family income in 1980, I do not make use of this information due to the problem of simultaneous 
causation.    
Several steps are required to use the NLMS to construct complete cohort mortality tables 
for specific groups.  The first step is to split the NLMS sample into separate groups based on the 
gender, race, ethnic and education categories.  For each group g the age-specific non-parametric 
(np) mortality rate, q
np
x,g, is calculated as the fraction of those individuals age x who die before  
                                                            
3 The mortality estimates used in this paper were constructed in joint work with Jeff Liebman, with assistance from 
Joshua Pollet.  Additional detail on the construction of these estimates will be made available in a forthcoming data 
appendix.   10 
attaining age x+1.  This procedure provides a simple, non-parametric estimate of the age specific 
mortality rate for individuals with the characteristics of group g.     
There are several reasons why one does not want to stop here and simply use these non-
parametric estimates.  First, sample sizes are quite small in some groups (e.g., college educated 
black men) at many ages, and therefore the point-estimates are noisy and even non-monotonic 
with age, which is clearly inconsistent with known actuarial experience.  Second, even if the 
NLMS data perfectly represented the population alive in 1980, this approach would only provide 
a 1980 “period” mortality table, or the mortality experience of individuals alive in 1980.  For 
purposes of this study, the table of interest is a “cohort” mortality table that represents the 
mortality experience of individuals born in a particular year.  The difference between these two 
tables arises from the fact that mortality rates have historically improved over time.  Thus, some 
method of conversion from a 1980 period table to a particular birth cohort table is required.  
Third, the NLMS study is not fully representative of the entire US population, in part because it 
excludes the institutionalized population and thus understates overall mortality rates.  Therefore, 
while the NLMS may contain valuable information about the relative mortality rates of various 
groups, it is unlikely to provide accurate information about the absolute levels of mortality for 
the population as a whole.  
In order to address these concerns, several additional steps are required.  In order to 
correct for non-monotonicity, the non-parametric estimates, q
np
x,g, are treated as the independent 
variable in a non-linear least squares regression on age x.  The non-linear regression is used to 
estimate three parameters of a Gompertz/Makeham survival function.  As explained in Jordan 
(1991), with the proper choice of the three parameters, this formula can be applied from about 
age 20 almost to the end of life.  The Gompertz/Makeham formula used is:   11 
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x is age, and g, c, and s are the parameters to be estimated.  Note that if l0 is set equal to one, then 
lx is simply the cumulative survival probability at age x.  Using the regression estimates of g, c, 
and s, one then has a “Makeham formula” that gives mortality qx as a function of x.  Let us 
denote these fitted values of mortality for group g at age x as q
fit
x,g.  An important feature of this 
approach is that fitted mortality rates are a monotonically increasing function of age x.  Another 
feature is that it allows one to create out-of-sample estimates of mortality.  Therefore, while I 
only use data from age 25 to 84 to fit the curve, I can then use the formula to provide us with 
estimates of mortality for ages outside of this range. 
  Once these predicted mortality rates are in hand, the next step is to convert them into 
cohort life tables for each group by making two related assumptions.  The first is that the ratios 
of a group’s age-specific mortality to that of the population as a whole (qx,g/qx) in the NLMS 
sample is an accurate portrayal of these ratios in the full population in 1980.  The second 
assumption is that these ratios are constant over time.  By invoking these two assumptions, it is 
possible to then construct a group specific cohort life tables for any year.  
  Specifically, let q
fit
x,g be the fitted value of the mortality rate for an individual age x 
belonging to group g, and let q
fit
x be the mortality rate for an individual age x for the population 
as a whole, both from the fitted NLMS data.  Let q
SSA
x be the age-specific mortality rate from the 
1978 birth cohort table from the Social Security Administration, which represents individuals 
turning age 22 in the year 2000.  Then the cohort, group specific mortality rates that I will use 
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  The one exception to this methodology is that in the case of college and high school 
educated black males and females, I assumed that the mortality ratio between education groups 
was the same for blacks as for whites.  I then applied the white education ratio to the fitted q’s 
for blacks in order to construct the estimates for higher educated blacks.  This was done because 
the sample sizes at many ages were too small for these black education groups to reliably 
construct an independent estimate. 
  Table 1 reports how the age to which a 22 year old in the year 2000 can expect to live 
varies by the gender, race, ethnicity, and education as calculated using the above methods.  The 
average 22 year old male can expect to live to age 77.4, while the average 22 year old woman 
can expect to live to age 83.4.  However, these estimates vary widely by race.  White, black, and 
Hispanic 22-year old males have life expectancies of 78.3, 71.8 and 77.4 years respectively, 
while white, black and Hispanic females have life expectancies of 84.0, 80.0, and 85.2 years 
respectively.   
    Life expectancy conditional on reaching age 22 also varies substantially by education 
level.  22 year old white men with less than a high school education can expect to live to age 
75.3 years, a full 5.2 years less than that of a white male with a college degree.  Low educated 
black males have by far the lowest conditional life expectancy of any group examined, at 68.1 
years.  The highest conditional life expectancy is college educated white women, who can expect 
to live to age 87.8.   
  Two partially offsetting limitations of these mortality differentials should be noted.  First, 
using education as a proxy for lifetime earnings may actually understate the extent to which 
mortality rates differ across socioeconomic groups.  Deaton & Paxson (1999) suggest that even   13 
after controlling for education, income differentials may continue to have an independent effect 
on mortality.  Second, these results do not differentiate based on disability status.  Disabled 
individuals experience higher mortality rates than the non-disabled population.  To the extent 
that disability status is correlated with gender, race, ethnicity, and education, the estimates 
presented here may be attributing too much of the mortality differential to these factors.        
  Because a life annuity is a financial vehicle that pays income contingent on the individual 
being alive, people with longer life expectancies generally expect to receive more annuity 
income than individuals with shorter life expectancies.  These differences suggest that 
demographic groups with lower average life expectancies will fare poorly under an annuity rule 
that mandates the use of a single annuity conversion factor, or a single price, for all individuals 
of the same age.  However, these differences can vary substantially based on the specific form 
that the annuity takes.  Therefore, the next Section discusses annuities in more detail. 
   
2.  The Accumulation Phase  
In general, there are two phases to an individual accounts retirement system.  The 
“accumulation phase” corresponds to an individual’s working life, when he or she is contributing 
a portion of earnings to an account that is invested in a diversified portfolio of securities.  Then, 
upon retirement, the individual stops contributing to the account and starts the “payout phase” in 
order to finance retirement consumption.
4  The design of each of these phases has potentially 
important distributional effects.  This section discusses the issues involved in the accumulation 
phase of the account.  Section 3 discusses payout options.    
                                                            
4 The accumulation and payout phases may overlap in some cases, such as when an individual begins a partial 
annuitization process prior to retirement.  For an example of this, see Kotlikoff & Sachs, 1998.   14 
The central question in the accumulation phase from a distributional perspective is what 
happens to the balance of an individual account upon the pre-retirement death of a worker.  
There are two options.  First, the account may be considered part of the decedant’s estate, and 
thus be made available to the individual’s family or other beneficiaries.  Second, the account 
could become the “property” of the Social Security system and redistributed to the remaining 
workers in the system.  In this latter case, the contributions made by early decedants are used to 
increase the rate of return to other participants in the system.   
Let qx represent the annual mortality rate for an individual of age x, and let r be the rate 
of return on investments in an individual account.  For simplicity, let us assume that r is fixed.  
Under the first option, whereby the account balance is bequeathable, the gross annual rate of 
return on the account is simply 1+r for all participants.  If an individual contributes $1 at the 
beginning of the year and survives, he will have 1+r dollars in his account at the end of the year.  
If he dies, his estate will have a value of 1+r dollars at the end of the year.  In the second case, in 
which the assets of deceased participants are redistributed to remaining participants, the gross 
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The (1-qx) factor in the denominator is the amount by which the return is increased to survivors.  
Thus, if the investment rate of return is 5%, and 1% of the population dies during the year, the 
account balance of survivors would increase by 6.06% in that year.  Feldstein & Ranguelova 
(1999) have shown that over the course of a lifetime, the cumulative effect of allowing pre-  15 
retirement bequests as part of a “Personal Security Accounts” system is to decrease the mean 
accumulation of assets at retirement by 14%.   
  Therefore, the question of whether or not to allow bequests boils down to a choice 
between providing wealth to estate beneficiaries or providing higher rates of returns to those who 
live a long time.  In thinking about the relative importance of bequests across groups, one must 
consider two factors, namely the relative size of accounts (the “income effect”) and the 
probability of dying before retirement age (the “mortality effect”).  Individuals with large 
account accumulations and with a high probability of dying before retirement will benefit the 
most from the bequest option.  However, these two factors often work in different directions, i.e., 
individuals with larger account balances are likely to have lower mortality rates, due to the 
inverse correlation between economic status and mortality. 
  In order to estimate the net effect of allowing bequests, I have constructed a measure of 
the expected, discounted value of bequests for each of the racial/ethnic/education groups as 
follows:  Suppose an “average” male enters the labor force at age 22, earning annual income I22.  




− + ⋅ =
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a g I I        ( 4 )  
where a represents the individual’s age.  Assume that α  is the fraction of income that is saved in 
an individual account each year, and that the account earns a real rate of interest r.  If qa 
represents the mortality rate at age a, and Pa represents the cumulative probability of surviving 
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If we assume that α , g, and r are the same for all groups, then differences in the expected present 
discounted value of bequests will arise from differences in mortality rates (Pa and qa) and 
differences in the level of income (I22).      
  To parameterize the income effect, i.e., differences in I22, I use the Social Security 
earnings records from the restricted data supplement to the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS).  
Specifically, I take the ratio of the mean Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME) for males 
in each socioeconomic group to the mean AIME for all males (using HRS population weights).  
These ratios are reported in column 1 of Table 2.  As these results indicate, there are substantial 
differences in the level of income earned by each group, with the average white male earning 6% 
more, the average black male earning 30% less, and the average Hispanic male earning 28% less 
than the average for all three groups combined.
5  For purposes of calculations in table 2, I will 
assume that these differences in AIME are indicative of a constant difference in annual earnings 
throughout one’s working life.  In other words, I use these ratios to shift the entire income path 
up and down, and assume that the slope of the income path (g in equations 4 and 5 above) is the 
same for all groups. 
  Columns 2 through 6 of Table 2 report the cumulative probability of leaving a bequest at 
ages 30, 40, 50, 60, and 67.  These figures provide some insight into the “mortality effect” on 
bequests, namely that holding account size equal, the expected value of bequests will be higher 
for individuals with higher mortality rates.  As these columns indicate, there is substantial 
heterogeneity in the cumulative probabilities at all ages. 
                                                            
5 These numbers reflect the AIME as of the survey date, when most of these individuals were still between the ages 
of 51 and 61, and thus still in the labor force.  Thus, these figures should be considered only a “rough 
approximation” as they do not control for differences in the age composition of each demographic group.   17 
Column 7 reports the expected present discounted value of bequests using equation 5 
above, setting g=.01, r=.03, α =.06, and I22=$30,000.  As can be seen the expected present 
discounted value of bequests for each group lies in between $5,932 and $10,205.  These rather 
small expected present values mask that fact that, conditional on dying and leaving a bequest, the 
average bequest size can be substantial.  For example, with a riskless real interest rate of only 
3%, the account balance of an “average” male would grow to over $200,000 before retirement.  
Feldstein and Ranguelova (1999) show that an individual investing in a mixed portfolio of bonds 
and equities would have an expected account size at retirement of nearly $500,000.  However, 
when these large bequests are discounted and multiplied by the relatively small probability of 
dying at each age, the expected present value of the average bequest is only $8,306.     
The final column of Table 2 provides a simple metric by which to compare the 
importance of bequests across groups, which is the ratio of the expected discounted value of 
bequests for each group to that of the average male.  As a starting point for interpreting these 
results, let us begin by comparing whites and blacks, without differentiating by educational 
attainment.  Looking at column 1 we again see that whites have higher earnings than blacks, and 
therefore will (holding α  and r equal) have higher individual account balances to bequeath.  
However, the probability of a black male dying and leaving a bequest is substantially higher than 
that of a white male.  The net effect is that the expected present value of bequests is 
approximately 4% higher for black men than white men ($8504 vs. $8178).     
  Looking down the last column provides insight into which groups stand to benefit the 
most from bequests.  Bequests are larger for lower education groups for both blacks and whites.  
Black men with a high school education or less, and white men with less than a high school 
education have an expected discounted value of bequest that is much higher than the average for   18 
all men.  This is driven primarily by high mortality rates among these groups.  Bequests are 
smallest relative to the average for white college educated men, and for Hispanics.  White 
college educated men have earnings that are 11% higher than average, but have a relatively low 
expected discounted value of bequests due to very low mortality rates.  The Hispanic result is 
driven largely by the fact that their earnings are quite low, with an AIME ratio of only 0.714, and 
the fact that their mortality rates are lower than for other groups with similarly low earnings, 
such as low educated blacks.  On the whole, it appears that allowing pre-retirement bequests is 
most beneficial to lower socioeconomic groups.  This is because the mortality effect is, in most 
cases, more important than the relative income effect.       
  
3.  The Payout Phase 
  Assuming survival to retirement age, the individual then enters the payout phase, or 
decumulation phase, of the individual account.  Perhaps the single most important design 
decision that must be made at this point is whether to require annuitization of the account 
balances at all.  Then, assuming that some level of annuitization is required, there are many 
additional choices that must be made.  How will the annuities be priced?  Will the payout be 
fixed in real terms, nominal terms, or will it vary with some underlying portfolio?  Will there be 
any provisions for bequests, such as guarantee periods or refund options?  Will the annuity be 
written to cover one life or two?  Will there be opportunities to take partial lump-sum 
withdrawals or to delay annuitization?  Each of these choices has different implications for how 
different groups fare under the individual accounts system.  Therefore, it is important to examine 
each of these issues separately.   19 
3.1  To Annuitize or Not to Annuitize   
The first issue that must be addressed is whether or not the individual accounts system 
mandates annuitization.  If individuals are allowed to freely access their account balances upon 
retirement, there would be no implicit transfers across groups, because at retirement, everyone 
would have access to their own contributions plus accumulated interest.  This approach would 
make the individual account little more than a traditional savings vehicle, albeit a required one. 
One problem with this approach of course is that it fails to provide individuals with any 
longevity insurance.  As a result, individuals facing an uncertain date of death would find it 
difficult to allocate wealth in a manner that does not “waste” resources in the event of an early 
death without placing the individual at risk of outliving their resources.  The insurance aspect of 
an annuity is potentially quite valuable.  As shown by Brown, Mitchell and Poterba (1999), a 65 
year-old male life cycle consumer with log utility and no bequest motive would find the 
opportunity to participate in an actuarially fair, real annuity market equivalent to a 50% increase 
in non-annuitized wealth.  While this measure probably overstates the value of annuitization due 
to the omission of precautionary savings motives, bequest motives, and pricing loads, it is 
nonetheless an indication that the longevity insurance benefits of annuities are quite valuable.  
Most proposals to reform the existing Social Security system, which currently provides a real 
annuity to retirees, recognize that some form of annuitization is desirable for this reason. 
Once it is recognized that some annuitization is desirable, there are many reasons to 
consider mandating a minimum level.  These reasons include the possibility that myopic 
consumers may fail to provide adequately for old-age consumption, as well as the possibility of 
actuarially unfair pricing that arises due to adverse selection and/or the correlation between 
income and mortality.  In what follows I proceed under the assumption that some level   20 
annuitization would be mandated in an individual accounts system, and focus on the implication 
of using different types of annuities.  After reviewing the distributional implications of various 
annuity mandates, I consider whether partial or delayed annuitization can lessen the 
distributional impact. 
3.2    Pricing Assumptions 
The initial working assumption in this paper is that the entity that provides the annuity, be 
it the government or a private insurance firm, provides a “single price, zero profit” annuity to all 
individuals.  “Single price” means that all individuals of the same age face the same price for a 
given stream of annuity income, i.e., annuity prices are not differentiated on the basis of 
individual or group characteristics.
6  Prices would be permitted to vary based on the age of  
annuitization only.  This assumption is made for two reasons.  First, the existing OASI benefit 
formula does not differ along any gender, race, or educational guidelines.  Two same-age 
individuals with the same average indexed monthly earnings (AIME) and who claim benefits on 
the same day, are entitled to identical monthly payments, regardless of any socioeconomic or 
demographic differences.  Second, permitting such differences in the U.S., particularly along 
racial lines, would likely be politically infeasible if not illegal.  While the private individual 
annuity market in the U.S. is permitted to use gender-specific pricing, job based pension 
annuities are not permitted to provide different annuity prices based on sex.
7        
The second assumption, that of “zero profit,” simply means that the annuities are priced 
so that the system breaks even over the whole population.  That is, the expected present  
                                                            
6 Sheshinksi (1999) has demonstrated the conditions under which a uniform pricing scheme may be optimal. 
7 In the City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 US 702 (1978), it was ruled that section 703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 barred requiring women to contribute more than men to pensions to receive the same benefits.  Five 
years later, Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris, 463 US 1073 (1983) held that the same law barred giving men 
a higher monthly benefit than women.   21 
discounted value of all future payouts is equal to the total of the premiums paid.  The implicit 
assumption is that administrative costs of the program are zero.  Another way of stating this is 
that the system is actuarially fair for the population as a whole, though not necessarily for any 
one individual.  While this assumption is clearly inaccurate given the likely existence of some 
level of administrative costs,
8 as long as these costs are apportioned as a fixed percentage of the 
account balance, this will reduce the money’s worth ratio for everyone by the same amount.  
Therefore, the relative transfers that occur between groups would be unaffected.       
3.3  Measures of Distribution:  The “Money’s Worth” Ratio 
In order to evaluate the distributional consequences of a particular annuity structure, it is 
necessary to choose a metric.  There are at least three measures of valuation that have been used 
in the literature on Social Security and annuities.  These are: (i) a Money’s Worth ratio, (ii) an 
internal rate of return, and (iii) a utility based measure of annuity valuation.  Each of these 
measures provides a slightly different way of comparing annuity options. 
The Money’s Worth measure is defined as the expected present discounted value (EPDV) 
of the stream of annuity payments, divided by the premium paid.  Take the simple case of an 
individual that pays an up-front, single-premium to purchase an immediate life annuity that pays 
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8 Several chapters in Shoven (2000) explore the potential importance of administrative costs in an inividual accounts 
system.  Samwick (1999) also provides an excellent discussion of reasons why these issues may be of less concern 
in the context of U.S. Social Security reform.     22 
where Pj is the probability of living to period j, r is the interest rate, and T is the number of 
periods remaining to the end of the maximum possible life span.   
The interpretation of the money’s worth ratio is quite simple.  If the MW is equal to one, 
then the expected discounted value of the benefit flow is exactly equal to the premium paid and 
can be said to be “actuarially fair” for the individual.  If the MW is less than one, then the 
individual is expected to receive less back in payouts than he paid in the premium, and thus the 
system is placing a negative expected transfer, or expected tax, on this person.  If the MW is 
greater than one, then the individual is expected to receive more in annuity payments than he or 
she paid into the system in premiums, and is therefore receiving a positive expected transfer. 
The first thing to note about this set-up is that as long as mortality risk differs across 
groups, providing life annuities under a single price constraint will generally lead to the MW 
measure differing across individuals.  That is, one can either have equal annuity payments per 
dollar premium for everyone, or one can have equal MWs for all individuals, but generally not 
both.
9  Only by completely eliminating the role of mortality risk in the valuation of annuities can 
the differences in MW across groups be made to disappear.   
The second method of measuring differences in annuity value is to use an internal rate of 
return, or IRR.  This measure is really just a restatement of the MW measure, since the internal 
rate of return is, by definition, the value of r that makes MW in equation 6 equal to one.  Since 
the same information is contained in the MW measure and the IRR measure, little is gained by 
reporting both.  Therefore, I will limit the results to the MW measure. 
                                                            
9 While it is generally true that different survival curves lead to different epdv’s of a given annuity flow, there are 
special cases in which two individuals with different survival curves will have an equal epdv.  This requires a 
crossover in mortality rates, i.e., that one person have higher mortality at one age, and lower mortality at a different 
age.  Similarly, it is possible that, with a non-zero discount rate, an individual with a longer life expectancy would 
none-the-less value an annuity less than an individual with a shorter life expectancy.     23 
Both the MW and the IRR measure are purely financial measures that do not capture the 
utility gains or losses associated with changes in a particular income stream.  Risk averse 
individuals will value the longevity insurance provided by annuities.  For example, Mitchell, 
Poterba, Warshawsky and Brown (1999) show that the utility gains to single life-cycle 
individuals are large enough that an annuity with a MW of only 0.80 might still be welfare-
enhancing.  
In the context of measuring distributional impacts across demographic groups, however, 
a utility-based analysis is less appealing for several reasons.  First, the magnitude of the utility 
gain is sensitive to the parameterization of the utility function and utility functions may differ 
across the demographic groups that we are analyzing.  For example, there is some evidence that 
risk aversion may differ between men and women (Eisenhower & Halek, 1999).  A second 
difficulty is that many annuity options involve payments to the estate of an insured individual 
after death.  In order to value these payments, it would be necessary to have a precise way to  
parameterize the utility of bequest function.  There is remarkably little consensus in the literature 
about how to model bequest motives, and virtually no consensus about the particular 
parameterization.  Research by Bernheim (1991), Laitner & Juster (1996) and Wilhelm (1996) 
all point to the existence of operative bequest motives, while Hurd (1987, 1989) and Brown 
(1999a, 1999b) find little evidence in support of such a view.   
For these reasons, I focus on the financial measure of Money’s Worth, keeping in mind 
that the utility consequences of a particular policy may differ from the distribution of MWs.  In 
particular, an individual may find an annuity welfare enhancing even if its MW is less than one.    24 
3.4  Individual Annuities:  Real and Nominal 
I first examine an annuity that closely mirrors the existing U.S. Social Security system – 
an immediate real annuity written on a single life.  With this form of an annuity, an individual 
simply exchanges their accumulated assets to the annuity provider (i.e., the government or the 
insurance company), and monthly payments to the individual commence immediately.  The 
monthly payout is received until the individual dies, at which time the annuity contract ends.  If 
the nominal payments from the annuity are indexed to the rate of inflation (as with the current 
OASI system), then the real value of the annuity payments is constant for the remainder of one’s 
life. 
The monthly income that would derive from an actuarially fair real annuity is easily 
computed.  Assuming that an individual converts $100,000 into such an annuity, the monthly 
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where r is the monthly real interest rate, Pj is the cumulative probability of surviving from the 
date of purchase of the annuity to date j, and T is the number of periods remaining until the 
individual reaches the assumed maximum life span.  If the annuity were fixed in nominal dollars 
instead of being indexed to inflation, the monthly real interest rate r would be replaced by the 
monthly nominal interest rate.    
  Due to the “single price” constraint, the value of A is constrained to be the same for all 
individuals.  This is accomplished by constructing Pj from a dollar-weighted average mortality of 
all participants in the individual accounts program.  For purposes of this paper, the value of A is 
determined by using a unisex version of the 1978 birth cohort table from the 1995 Social 
Security Administration Trustees’ report.  This represents the “average” mortality of the entire   25 
population that turns age 22 in the year 2000, including men and women of all races and 
economic groups.  Assuming a 3% real interest rate, the value of A for a real single life annuity 
for a 67 year-old individual is $621.25 per month.     
  It should be noted that this method of constructing the monthly payout of an annuity may 
differ from the value of A that would be required to make the system break-even.  This is 
because the unisex table is weighted by the number of lives rather than the number of dollars in 
the accounts.  It is not clear in which direction this may bias the value of A, because there are 
two offsetting effects.  First, a unisex table places heavy weight on female mortality, especially 
at older ages when the number of women in the population surpasses the number of men.  If 
women, who have lower mortality rates, tend to accumulate lower account balances due to lower 
earnings and/or lower labor force participation, the use of a unisex table will understate average 
mortality.  The second effects is that if individuals with larger account balances live longer, then 
using people-weights instead of dollar-weights will tend to overstate average mortality.  Because 
these two effects work in offsetting directions, the net bias is unclear.  Importantly, the effect of 
any such bias is to change the value of A for every one, so while the absolute level of the MW 
may change, the difference in MW across groups will remain unaffected.     
  To compute the MW for each gender/race/education group, the survival probabilities for 
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Note that if Pg,j from equation 8 equals Pj from equation 6 (i.e., group mortality equals the 
mortality rates used in pricing the annuity), then the annuity is priced in an actuarially fair 
manner for that group, and the MW will equal to one.   26 
  Table 3 reports the MW values for the various demographic groups under three different 
assumptions.  The first two columns report the MW for an individual real annuity when real rate 
of interest is 3% (column 1) and 6% (column 2).  Column 3 reports the MW for a nominal 
annuity when the real rate of interest and the rate of inflation are both set equal to a fixed 3%.  
Note that a “nominal” annuity with a fixed inflation rate corresponds to a declining real annuity. 
  The first finding is that the use of a unisex pricing structure results in large expected 
transfers from men to women.  Focusing first on the case of a real annuity with a 3% interest 
rate, we can see that because female mortality rates are lower than male mortality rates at all 
ages, the average MW for men is .920 while the average for women is 1.076.  This means that 
the average male can expect to receive 92 cents in annuity income for every dollar used to 
purchase the annuity, while the average woman can expect to receive nearly $1.08 for every 
dollar contributed.  In essence, this pricing structure results in approximately a transfer from men 
to women equal to approximately 8% of the accumulated wealth.  Importantly, one way to 
“correct” for this transfer across genders, at least for the case of married individuals, is to require 
the purchase of a joint and survivor annuity, which will be discussed below. 
  Looking within gender groups, we also see large differences in the MW across 
racial/ethnic lines.  Black men do particularly poorly under this individual real annuity, having a 
MW of only 0.862.  This means that the average black male can expect to lose approximately 
14% of his account balance due to his higher mortality risk.  White and Hispanic men, on the 
other hand, have quite slightly more favorable MW ratios of 0.927 and 0.920 due to their low 
mortality rates.  A similar pattern is found among women, although in all cases the MW ratios 
are higher than for men.  Black women on average have a MW close to one (1.022), indicating 
that the mortality advantage of being female is largely offset by the mortality disadvantage of   27 
being black.  White women have a MW of 1.084, while Hispanic women have a very high MW 
of 1.123.  Thus, just as black men are at a 14% disadvantage, Hispanic women are at a 12% 
advantage when an individual real annuity is used. 
  Further segmenting the population by educational attainment shows even further diversity 
in the MW calculations.  Across all racial and gender lines, there is a monotonic positive 
relationship between the level of education and the MW. Having at least a college education 
raises the MW to 0.967 for white men.  It is also clear that low educated black males are the most 
disadvantaged group due to their poor mortality prospects.  They can expect to receive only 80 
cents on the dollar that is annuitized in a real annuity.  The biggest “winners” are well-educated 
white women and Hispanic who have MW ratios of 1.106 and 1.123 respectively. 
  The next column in Table 3 shows how the results for a real annuity differ if the interest 
rate is 6% instead of 3%.  The central result is that a higher interest rate reduces the dispersion in 
MW ratios, raising the MW for groups with a low MW and lowering the MW for groups with a 
higher MW, although the reduction in dispersion is small.  Increasing the interest rate from 3% to 
6% increases the monthly payment from $621.25 to $805.14.  In this case, individuals who die 
early will have already received a higher income in the early periods.  Long-lived individuals 
also receive the higher benefit, and for longer, but these later payments are being discounted at a 
higher rate.       
The third column of Table 3 reports the MW results for a nominal annuity.  Nominal 
annuities may be less attractive than inflation indexed annuities, since the latter offer the 
advantage of providing a constant real consumption stream.  Previous work by Brown, Mitchell 
& Poterba (1999) indicates that real annuities offer utility gains in excess of that provided by 
annuities that are fixed in nominal terms, particularly in a world with uncertain inflation.    28 
However, the initial annuity payment is lower for real annuities.  For example, if there were a 
constant inflation rate of 3% annually, the real annuity would have an initial payment of $621.25 
per month, while the nominal annuity would have an initial payment of $808.86 per month.  Due 
to inflation, however, the real value of the nominal annuity would decline over time at a rate of 
3% per annum.  Thus the real value of a nominal annuity is “front-loaded.”  For individuals 
facing higher than average mortality risk, front-loading annuities will increase their MW, since 
they are relatively more likely to be alive to receive these larger early payments. 
Not surprisingly, the use of a nominal annuity has a similar effect as increasing the real 
interest rate, namely, it decreases the degree of dispersion in MW.  This is simply because the 
shorter duration of the nominal annuity helps those with high mortality risk, and hurts those with 
low mortality risk.  Using a nominal annuity in a world with a fixed inflation rate of 3% reduces 
the largest negative transfer (from low educated black men) to 17% of the account balance, 
versus 20% for a real annuity.  It is again important to stress, however, that while providing a 
nominal annuity has the possibly beneficial effect of compressing the dispersion in MW ratios, it 
is possible that all groups could be made worse off by this choice.  In a utility maximizing 
framework, the benefit of nominal annuities to high mortality risk individuals could be 
completely offset by the loss in utility from being subjected to an uncertain income stream.     
  It is important to recognize that the results so far may represent the “worst case scenario” 
from a distributional perspective.  This is because the use of survivor and bequest options can 
improve the money’s worth for individuals who value money left to beneficiaries.  It is to these 
types of policies that I now turn.    29 
3.5   Period Certain Options 
Continuing to operate within the realm of single life annuities, there are several options 
available that can help to increase the MW for individuals who face poor mortality prospects.  A 
“Period Certain” option specifies a minimum number of years that the annuity payout will be 
made, regardless of the survival of the insured.  Then, at the end of the guarantee period, the 
contract reverts to a straight life annuity and payments continue if and only if the insured 
individual is alive.  In the current market for single premium immediate annuities in the U.S., 
insurance companies are willing to offer certainty periods of nearly any length, though 10 years 
and 20 years are most common.    
With a “Period Certain” option, even if an individual faces a high probability of death 
early in the payout phase, the beneficiaries of the individual’s estate will continue to benefit from 
the annuity.  The reason these options serve to compress the distribution of MW ratios towards 
one is that they lessen the importance of individual mortality risk in the MW calculation.   
Period certain options are quite common in private annuity markets in the U.S.  
According to the Life Insurance Market Research Association, if one looks at individually-
purchased (non-group) fixed individual annuities sold in the U.S., 73% of individual life 
annuities and 64% of joint and survivor life annuities included a period certain option (LIMRA 
1998).  TIAA-CREF also reports that 74% of male annuitants choose a period certain option on 
their annuity (King 1996).  It is unclear what motivates this choice.  Bequests are certainly one 
reason, since it is the beneficiaries of the policy that stand to gain from this policy.  However, it 
seems unusual that an individual desire to leave a bequest only if they die in the next 10 years, 
but not thereafter.  One natural alternative would be to leave a portion of wealth un-annuitized, 
and either gift it or bequeath it upon death.  Discussions with individuals in the insurance   30 
industry indicate that the guarantee periods are often used more to overcome superstition or some 
form of ex ante regret that comes from the idea that one might turn over their money to an 
insurance company, and then die soon thereafter.  A second alternative for leaving a bequest is 
for an individual to use a portion of the monthly annuity payment to pay the premium on a life 
insurance contract, thus offsetting a portion of any mandated annuitization (Bernheim, 1991).  In 
previous work, however, I have shown that elderly individuals do not appear to use life insurance 
to offset the annuity from the existing Social Security system (Brown, 1999).     
The pricing of a “life annuity with C year certain” is a straightforward extension of 
equation 7 above.  Again assuming a $100,000 initial premium, the annuity amount APC, is 
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The difference from the formula for a straight life annuity is that for the first C years, payments 
are made regardless of the individual’s survival.  Therefore the Pj term is excluded from the 
pricing equation for the first 12*C months. 
  Because the first C years of payments are not life contingent, the amount of the amount 
of the monthly payment APC is less than the monthly income that would be received under a 
straight life annuity A.  Table 4 shows the monthly income that would be available to an 
individual who chooses a single life annuity, a life annuity with 10 year certain and a life annuity 
with a 20 year certain.  Looking at the first row, for real annuities, and again using the 
assumption of a unisex population average mortality table and a real interest rate of 3%, we see 
that the monthly incomes for a 67 year-old annuitant are approximately $621, $586, and $503 
respectively.  Thus, a 10 year period certain option reduces the income available to the insured   31 
by 6%, while a 20 year option reduces monthly income by 19%.  For a nominal annuity, the 
nominal monthly incomes from these three options are approximately $809, $760, and $669.    
   The fact that the survival probabilities for the first C years is irrelevant for the pricing of 
annuities with period certain options means that mortality differentials across individuals are also 
irrelevant during the first C years.  As a result, period certain options offer an effective vehicle 
for bringing the money’s worth ratios of various groups closer to one if an individual values 
benefits to survivors as much as benefits to himself.  To think about the Money’s Worth of a 
Period Certain product, let us generalize the MW formula as follows:   
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where µ  represents a measure of the value of a dollar left to beneficiaries to the value of a dollar 
consumed by the individual purchasing the annuity.  If µ =1, we are back to purely a financial 
calculation, and assuming that a dollar to the insured individual’s estate is equivalent to a dollar 
to the individual while alive.  In this case, the individual fully values the first C years of 
payments, regardless of survival.  If µ <1, then the individual values a dollar to his estate less 
than a dollar while alive.  In the extreme case of µ =0, the individual does not value the period 
certain benefits at all, and the formula collapses to equation 9.  Only now, because APC is less 
than A when there is no period certain benefit, the MW will be much lower. 
  Table 5 reports results for real annuities with period certain options, for the case of r=.03.  
The first column reports the MW for the real individual life annuity first reported in table 3.  
Columns 2 and 3 report the MW for a real annuity with a 10 year period certain feature, under 
two different assumptions about µ  (1 and 0).  Columns 4 and 5 report results for a real annuity 
with a 20 year period certain feature, again for two values of µ .   32 
  Comparing columns 1 and 2, we see that if individuals fully value income to beneficiaries 
(µ =1), then the use of a 10-year period certain option reduces dispersion by pushing most of the 
MW measures towards one.  The overall effect is modest, increasing the average male MW from 
0.920 to 0.936 and decreasing the average female MW from 1.076 to 1.061.  Usually, however, 
the more a group’s mortality differs from that of the average, the greater the change in the MW 
as we move from straight life to period certain annuities.  Considering the effect on the 
“outliers,” we see that the MW for low educated black males increase by roughly 6% of wealth, 
from 0.800 to 0.861, and that for highly educated white women decreases from 1.106 to 1.080. 
  Columns 3, however, shows that this reduction in the MW dispersion is clearly dependent 
on the assumption that µ =1.  If µ =0, so that individuals place no value on money left behind in 
an estate, the MW falls below the level of a real annuity for everyone, and the level of dispersion 
is similar to the level in column 1.  For example, the difference between the highest MW 
(Hispanic women) and the lowest MW (black men less than high school) is .323 for a life 
annuity and .306 for an annuity with a 10-year period certain option that has no value (µ =0).   
   The final two columns of table 5 show results for the case of a 20-year period certain 
option.  The effect on the MW of a 20 year PC option is substantially greater than that of a 10 
year, because mortality is rising rapidly between ages 77 and 87 (the second 10-year period for 
an individual annuitizing at age 67).  Assuming that survivor benefits are valued fully, all of the 
MWs are now much closer to one.  The largest negative transfer is now less than less than 5%, 
down from 20% with a straight life annuity.  Thus, to the extent that annuitants fully value 
benefits to their beneficiaries, a 20-year period certain option substantially reduces the degree of 
redistribution.  Once again, however, if benefits paid to beneficiaries are not fully valued, 
individuals can be made substantially worse off.  In fact, with µ =0, every single Money’s Worth   33 
ratio is less than one.  Even college educated white women have a MW of below 0.90.  The 
reason is simple – a 20 year period certain option reduces monthly income by 19%.  This 19% is 
a pure cost if the individual does not place any value on the benefits paid after death.  
3.6 Refund  Options 
Annuity providers often provide “refund” options to annuitants as an alternative to a 
period certain feature.  While there are many possible ways to structure a refund option, the most 
popular form in the U.S. market for immediate annuities is to offer a “money back guarantee.”  
The annuity company offers to provide a monthly payment Ar for as long as the individual lives.  
Upon death, the company agrees to return to the beneficiary the initial premium, minus any 
annuity payments made to date.  For example, suppose an individual purchases an annuity with a 
$100,000 premium, and receives $500 per month in income from a refund annuity.  After 10 
years (120 months), the individual will have received $60,000 in (nominal) payments.  If the 
insured dies at this point, his beneficiaries would receive $40,000.  Note that the amount 
guaranteed is the nominal value of the original premium, and no consideration is given to issues 
of discounting.   
A second popular refund option works in a similar manner.  The difference is that instead 
of providing a lump-sum “payoff” at death, it continues to provide monthly payments Ar to the 
beneficiary until such time that the nominal value of the premium has been paid out.  In this case, 
the annuity is little more than a C-year period certain product in disguise, where the guarantee 
period C is chosen so that Ar*(12*C) = Premium.  For example, with an interest rate of 3% and 
an inflation rate of 3%, an annuity an installment refund annuity sold to a 67 year old is identical 
to a “life annuity with 11.4 year period certain.”  Calculations of the Money’s Worth ratios for   34 
both of these options indicate that they lie between the rates for a straight life annuity, and a life 
annuity with a 20 year period certain option, and so are not reported separately in the tables.   
In theory, one could provide a refund option that ensures that the beneficiaries receive a 
death benefit that returns the full actuarial value of the annuity upon the death of the beneficiary.  
In fact, such a “residual balance annuity” is discussed in Feldstein & Ranguelova (1999) for the 
case of a variable annuity product.  In the case of a fixed annuity, this would result by definition 
in a MW equal to one for everyone.  However, this product offers no mortality premium, and in 
fact, no insurance market is even required.  Individuals can replicate this residual balance annuity 
by amortizing the account balance in real terms over the maximum remaining years of life.  For 
perspective, while a real annuity with no period certain offers a real monthly payment of $621, 
amortizing the $100,000 until age 100 results in a monthly income of only $389, a 37% 
reduction.  In addition, this approach requires that the individual know the maximum possible 
age with certainty.  If there is any chance that the individual would live past age 100, she would 
outlive her resources.   
3.7   Joint and Survivor Annuities 
According to the Census Bureau projections for the year 2000, 62.4% of individuals aged 
65 to 74 will be married with a spouse present.  Married individuals nearing retirement are 
concerned with the consumption opportunities of both spouses, and therefore a single life annuity 
may be inappropriate.  Joint and survivor annuities, which provide a stream of income as long as 
either spouse is alive, provide a spouse with protection against a drop in living standard upon the 
death of the insured individual.   
Another reason for considering joint life annuities is that it provides a mechanism for 
providing for non-working spouses of insured individuals.  While the labor force participation of   35 
women has been steadily increasing throughout the 20
th century, it is likely to continue to be the 
case that large numbers of married individuals (primarily women) will accumulate very little in 
an individual account.  Mandating the use of joint and survivor annuities for married couples is 
one way to ensure some level of income for elderly widows.    
As discussed in more detail in Brown & Poterba (1999), there are two primary types of 
joint annuity contracts.  The first is a joint life annuity with a last survivor payout rule.  This rule 
specifies a monthly payment that will be paid as long as both members of the couple are still 
alive, and also specifies a fraction of this payment, φ , that will be paid to the survivor after the 
death of one member of the couple.  With the second type of contract, often called a joint and 
contingent survivor annuity, one member of the couple is specified as the primary annuitant.  As 
long as the primary annuitant is alive, the annuity payment is fixed at A.  However, upon the 
death of the primary annuitant, the payment to the secondary annuitant declines to a fraction θ  of 
the original payment.  If, on the other hand, the secondary annuitant dies first, the payment to the 
primary annuitant does not change.         
This paper will restrict attention to joint and last survivor annuities, which treats the 
spouses symmetrically.  The pricing of a joint and survivor annuity is again a simple extension of 
the pricing of a single life annuity. 
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In pension plans and in the individual annuity market, φ  is usually set equal to 0.5, 0.67, 
or 1.0, although insurance companies are generally willing to provide annuities for any value of 
φ  between 0 and 1.  When φ  takes the value of 1.0, these products are often called “joint and full 
survivor” annuities.  In this case, the monthly annuity payment does not change upon the death   36 
of the first spouse.  In order to compute the value of AJ&S above, one must decide which values 
of Pm,j and Pf.j to use for pricing the annuity.  Rather than using a unisex table, in this case I 
choose to use average male mortality rates to compute Pm,j and average female mortality rates to 
compute Pf,j.
10     
  To compute the Money’s Worth for different groups, it is now necessary to match up 
characteristics of husbands and wives.  With 7 different racial/ethnic/education groups for each 
gender, this leads to 49 different possible “couples.”  Rather than examine every combination, 
results are presented for the case in which matching occurs within groups.  Therefore, white 
college educated men are matched with white college educated women.  Table 6 reports results 
for real annuities, both for a 50% survivor benefit (top panel) as well as for a full survivor benefit 
(lower panel).  In the first column I report results for a joint and survivor annuity with no period 
certain option.  In columns 2-5, I report the MW for joint and survivor annuities with 10 and 20 
year period certain options.  In each of the period certain cases, I show results for µ =1 (full 
valuation of beneficiary income) and µ =0 (zero valuation).   
As the results indicate, the MW ratios are substantially closer to one than in the case of 
individual annuities.  For example, even in the case of the lowest money’s worth for a full 
survivor annuity, that of low educated blacks, the MW for a joint and full survivor annuity is  
0.932.  The highest couple MW is 1.021 for Hispanic couples.  While these implicit transfers are 
still large in magnitude, they are much smaller than for individuals alone for two reasons.  First, 
even if two individuals with identical mortality purchase a joint-and-survivor annuity, the MW 
will be closer to 1.0.  This is because the annuity will continue to pay out as long as either of the  
                                                            
10 I have also calculated the MW ratios for joint and survivor annuities under the assumption that it is priced using 
the unisex table for both spouses.  The results are nearly identical, with the MW calculated under these two methods 
never varying by more than .003.     37 
two individuals is alive, and the probability that both individuals die very early is less than the 
probability that any one of them will.  For example, even if two individuals with the mortality 
characteristics of low-educated black males were to purchase a joint and full survivor annuity, 
the MW would be 0.843, as opposed to a MW of 0.800 if each individual purchased a separate 
single life annuity.  The second reason, which has an even greater effect on the results, is that 
one of the primary sources of variation in mortality rates is gender.  By pooling together the 
mortality of a male and a female, and pricing accordingly, this source of dispersion in the 
money’s worth ratio is largely removed.  Thus, even in the case of a couple consisting of a black 
male and a black female, both with less than a high school education, the MW ratio is 0.932.  
The lower panel of table 6 shows similar results for the case of a joint and 50% survivor annuity.  
Comparing the upper and lower panels, we see that higher survivor benefits tend to reduce MW 
dispersion by more. 
The remaining columns in Table 6 report results of combining a real joint and survivor 
annuity with a year period certain option.  As with the case of individuals, the inclusion of a 
period certain option tends to decrease the dispersion of MW ratios if the benefits to 
beneficiaries are fully valued.  In the case of a joint and full survivor annuity with a 20 year 
period certain, the MW ratios are extremely close to one.  The largest negative transfer appears 
to be from low educated blacks, but it represents only a 2.1% reduction in wealth.  The largest 
positive transfer is to Hispanic couples, who receive a net surplus of 1.2%.       
It must again be noted, however, that providing a joint and survivor annuity with a 20 
year period certain option has a cost.  This cost is a decline in the monthly income that is made 
available to individuals when they annuitize.  For example, whereas a real single life annuity 
provided $623 per month in income, a joint and full survivor annuity provides only $503 in   38 
income.  Adding a 20-year certain option to this annuity reduces the benefit further to $474 per 
month.  As a result of this nearly 6% reduction in income from adding a 20% period certain to a 
joint and survivor annuity, the MW of the 20-year period certain is significantly lower if the 
couple does not value income to beneficiaries (i.e., if µ =0).     
3.8    Variable Annuity Issues 
Up until this point, the annuities discussed in this paper have been fixed nominal or fixed 
real annuities.  The defining feature of these annuities is that once the initial value of the annuity 
is determined, it remains constant in nominal or real terms for the duration of the annuity 
contract (excepting pre-determined reductions upon one death in a joint and survivor annuity).  
However, many proposals for an individual accounts system, such as that outlined by Feldstein, 
Ranguelova, and Samwick (1999), foresee a role for variable annuity products. 
The general conclusions of the distributional analysis conducted for fixed annuities 
carries over for variable annuity products as well.  With variable products, it will still be the case 
that, in expectation, resources are transferred from high-mortality risk individuals to low-
mortality risk individuals.  It also remains true that the use of joint life annuities, period certain 
guarantees, and refunds reduce the extent of these transfers.  However, there is one additional 
“choice variable” in constructing a variable annuity payout stream that deserves attention here – 
the “Assumed Interest Rate,” or AIR. 
As discussed in Bodie & Pesando (1983) and Brown, Mitchell & Poterba (1999), the 
amount of the initial variable annuity payment is a function of the AIR.  To determine the initial 
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where R is the AIR.  The annuity updating rule depends on the return of the assets that back the 
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R is the key parameter in designing a variable annuity.  Assuming a high value of R will enable 
the insurance company to offer a large initial premium, but the stream of future payouts is less 
likely to increase, or more likely to decline, as the assumed value of R rises. 
  For example, if R is set equal to the expected real return on the underlying portfolio, then 
the expected slope of the real consumption stream is flat.  That is, if the portfolio return in each 
period was equal to its expectation, and thus equal to R, the real value of the annuity would be 
constant in real terms.  In periods when the portfolio’s real return falls short of its expectation, 
the real value of the annuity payment would fall.  Similarly, when the portfolio outperforms 
expectations, the annuity value would rise in real terms.  If R is set equal to 0, the initial value of 
the annuity, A(0) is relatively low, but the income stream will rise and fall in exact proportion to 
the underlying portfolio.  Therefore, the annuity payments will, on average, increase in value at a 
rate equal to the expected return of the underlying portfolio.     
As was the case with fixed annuities, “front-loading” annuities has the effect of lessening 
the size of the expected transfers, since high-mortality risk individuals are more likely to receive 
a higher proportion of their premium back.  Thus, setting a higher assumed interest rate will 
result in less redistribution from high mortality rate groups to lower mortality groups.  This 
finding is directly analogous to the difference between real and nominal annuities discussed 
earlier – high mortality risk individuals receive a higher money’s worth out of nominal annuities 
because the real value of these payments are higher in the early periods.     40 
3.9   Delayed Annuitization 
As reported by Finkelstein & Poterba (1995), pensions in the United Kingdom since 1995 
have offered an “income withdrawal option.”  This option allows an individual to delay the 
purchase of an annuity until age 75, provided that he or she draws an income from the pension 
fund in the meantime that is between 35 and 100% of the amount that would otherwise be 
received from an annuity.  If the pensioner dies prior to annuitization, the assets in the fund 
become part of the individual’s estate. 
From an expected bequest point-of-view, this option benefits the estate of individuals 
who have particularly high probabilities of dying between the ages of 67 and 77.  Table 7 reports 
the 10-year mortality probability of each group, conditional on reaching age 67.  As the table 
indicates, large disparities in mortality rates continue at these older ages.  Female mortality rates 
are still below those of men, blacks have higher mortality rates than whites and Hispanics, and 
lower education groups have higher rates than high education groups. 
  As with all bequest options, the difficulty with this approach it must reduce the income 
available to annuitants.  I have already shown that a 67 year-old individual purchasing an annuity 
with $100,000 would be entitled to a monthly income of $621, assuming that annuities were 
priced on a unisex basis.  Imagine that instead of purchasing an annuity at age 67, the individual 
instead consumed $621 per month out of the individual account, and that the account continued 
to accrue interest at a rate of 3% per annum.  After 10 years, the individual would have an 
account balance of $47,759.  If the individual annuitizes the account balance at this point, the 
annuity would provide monthly income of approximately $419, or fully one-third less than the 
income that would have been provided if an annuity were purchased ten years earlier.  This is the   41 
fundamental trade-off – if the individual dies between ages 67 and 77, the heirs receive at least 
$47,759 dollars.  But if the individual survives, her income is 33% less for the rest of her life. 
  Alternatively, consider what would happen if the individual did not annuitize at all, but 
continued to consume $621 per month starting at age 67.  The individual account would be 
depleted after 17 years and 2 months, or at age 84.  Approximately 44% of all men and 61% of 
all women will still be alive at age 84, the point at which they would exhaust their resources if 
they tried to “self-annuitize.”  This is quite obviously not the optimal consumption path in the 
absence of annuitization, but it illustrates the key point that delaying annuitization comes at a 
cost of future consumption for longer-lived individuals.         
3.10  Partial Annuitization Revisited 
Now that we have discussed numerous annuity payout options in more detail, it is 
instructive to again revisit the issue of partial annuitization.  All of the transfers noted above 
occur as a result of mortality differentials across groups.  Any portion of an account that is not 
annuitized is therefore not subject to these redistributive effects.  Put simply, if individuals are 
required to annuitize exactly 50% of their account balances, then the amount of redistribution 
would be cut in half, since the “money’s worth” of the non-annuitized portion is equal to 1.0. 
One possible partial annuitization policy would be to require a minimum amount of 
annuitization, where the minimum was chosen to be above some baseline level, such as the 
poverty line.  In the U.S., it would be important to set the baseline above the level of any other 
government income guarantee program, such as SSI, in order to ensure that individuals did not 
rapidly spend down their individual account assets and then become dependent on SSI.   
  The primary disadvantage of allowing for partial lump-sum withdrawals is that 
individuals lose part of the longevity insurance that an annuity is meant to provide.  The   42 
individual is still faced with the problem of determining how to optimally allocate the non-
annuitized wealth in the face of an uncertain lifetime.  If one of the reasons for requiring a forced 
retirement savings program at all is that individuals are too myopic to save adequately for old 
age, then this myopia may lead them to squander the lump-sum portion of their savings in a sub-
optimal fashion.     
  Despite these disadvantages, allowing for some fraction of benefits to be left 
unannuitized has several potential benefits.  First, as we have seen, it reduces the amount of 
redistribution in the annuity pricing system from long-lived to short-lived individuals.  Second, it 
loosens the liquidity constraint on the elderly that an annuity imposes, which can be beneficial in 
cases in which the elderly are hit with large unplanned expenditures, such as for unforeseen 
medical expenditures.  Third, it provides individuals with bequest motives a natural way to 
provide gifts and/or bequests to their children, that is not subject to the somewhat arbitrary 
timing constraints of the bequest that comes with period certain or refund options on an annuity.  
Finally, it should be noted that the utility gains that come from annuitizing one’s resources are a 
decreasing function of the amount of wealth already annuitized.  In other words, the first dollar 
of annuitized wealth has a much larger utility impact than the last dollar.  Therefore, annuitizing 
50% of one’s wealth captures significantly more than 50% of the utility gains from annuitization.  
Thus, the “cost” of the lump-sum option may not be as great as it seems at first glance. 
  The U.K. retirement system has a “partial annuitization” option in its personal pension 
schemes, as described in Finkelstein & Poterba (1999).  In these personal pension plans, 
individuals are permitted to take up to 25% of their fund (up to a maximum amount) as a lump-
sum at retirement.  It is important that this lump-sum option is an option, not a requirement, of 
the program.  Allowing this as an option rather than as a requirement has two partially offsetting   43 
effects from a distributional perspective.  If it is primarily lower socioeconomic groups (with 
higher mortality rates) that choose the lump-sum option, this places more resources into their 
hands prior to death, presumably making them better off.  However, this selection process will 
also have the effect of making annuities more expensive, since the dollar-weighted mortality 
rates of the annuitized pool would be improved.  This would reduce reduce the money’s worth of 
annuities to all participants, including those in the least well of groups.         
 
4.  Alternative Pricing Assumptions 
Nearly all of the numerical results of the last section were driven entirely be the “single 
price” assumption, i.e., the constraint that all individuals of the same age would receive the same 
monthly annuity income per dollar of premium paid, regardless of individual characteristics.  
This assumption is certainly not the only assumption that can be made, although it is arguably 
the most politically feasible.  For example, private annuity markets in the U.S. currently price 
annuities separately for men and women.  In addition, there is at least one U.S. company that 
offers a “Smoker’s Preferred” annuity contract, that offers higher monthly income for individuals 
who are smokers, and thus have higher mortality risk. 
It is in the interest of individuals who face high mortality risk to allow the annuity 
provider to use as much information as possible to price annuities.  The reason is that a provider 
can offer a much higher level of monthly income to a high mortality risk individual if they are 
allowed to price based on this higher risk level.  This leads to some results that are quite counter 
to our usual sense of political feasibility.  For example, it would be very much in the interest of 
black men with less than a high school education to allow insurance companies to use race as a 
factor in the pricing of annuities.   44 
For perspective, table 8 reports the monthly annuity payment that would be offered to 
individuals if annuity prices were set separately for each demographic group, and were priced in 
an actuarially fair manner for each group.  Recall that when individual real annuities were priced 
based on a single unisex life table with a real interest rate of 3%, a $100,000 premium bought an 
individual a stream of payments of approximately $621 per month for a 67 year-old.  Allowing 
for gender specific pricing only, men would receive $675 per month, while women would 
receive $577 per month. 
Allowing pricing based on gender and race would result in white, black, and Hispanic 
men receiving $670, $720, and $675 per month respectively.  White, black, and Hispanic women 
would receive $573, $608, and $553 respectively.  Further differentiation by educational status 
results in an even wider dispersion of monthly payments.  Again looking at the extreme cases, a 
low educated black male would receive $777 per month, fully $215 more per month than a 
white, college educated woman.   
It is also important to note however that “group” mortality rates are only averages, and 
that there is a significant degree of dispersion around this average within each group.  Thus, 
while it is true that college educated white women on average live longer than black men with 
less than a high school education, it is not true that this holds for every individual in each group.  
Some white women will have mortality rates that more closely resemble that of black men, and 
vice-versa.  As a result, any pricing scheme that seeks to address mortality heterogeneity by 
pricing based on group characteristics will make some individuals even worse off.  For example, 
if annuities are priced on a gender-specific basis, this will be especially harmful to women who 
have mortality rates that look more like those of men.  Of course, it is now conceivable to think 
that, given the rapid rise in medical technology, companies in the future will be able to determine   45 
individual-specific mortality rates with a fairly high degree of precision.  Already, there is debate 
about whether to allow insurance companies to use data from DNA tests to make insurance 
decisions.  Unlike markets for health insurance and life insurance, in which unhealthy 
individuals would prefer that the insurance company not be permitted to use this information, in 
annuity markets the preferences are reversed.  Individuals who can be identified as being at a 
higher risk of dying should welcome the use of this information in the pricing of annuities, as it 
would lead to a higher benefit. 
 
5.  Summary and Future Directions 
This paper has measured the magnitude of the expected transfers that would result under 
various annuity options in an individual accounts system.  These expected transfers arise because 
mortality is significantly correlated with socioeconomic factors such as gender, race, and level of 
education.  These transfers appear to be economically important in both the accumulation phase 
of the individual accounts and in the payout phase. 
Allowing for pre-retirement bequests from individual accounts is relatively more 
important to groups with high mortality rates at younger ages.  For example, estimates from this 
paper suggest that 41.2% of 22 year old black males with less than a high school education in the 
year 2000 will not survive to age 67.  While these high mortality rate groups tend to have below 
average lifetime earnings, the net effect appears to be that these low-income groups tend to have 
higher expected bequests than higher income groups.  Thus, allowing pre-retirement bequests 
may be an important element in reducing the extent of regressive redistribution.         
During the payout phase of the annuity, mortality differences are also quite important.  
Assuming that the political system constrains annuity prices to be blind to socioeconomic   46 
mortality differences, the “money’s worth” of retirement annuities can vary greatly across 
groups.  The money’s worth is lower for men than for women, lower for blacks than for whites, 
and are increasing in an individual’s education level.  For some annuity design options, such as 
an individual, real life annuity, these transfers can be as large as 20% of wealth.  Importantly, 
these expected transfers are generally regressive, in the sense that they are going from the 
economically worse off individuals to better off individuals.    
The degree of dispersion in the money’s worth ratios is very sensitive to the precise 
structure of the annuity program.  Annuities which “front-load” payments, or which provide 
continued payments to an individual’s estate after death, result in much less redistribution.  The 
use of joint life annuities rather than single life annuities largely eliminates the transfers that 
occur across gender lines.  The use of a joint and survivor annuity with a “20-year certain” 
provision reduces the largest negative transfer to only 2% of wealth.     
All of the options that reduce the implicit transfers do so at the cost of lowering the 
monthly income that can be provided to all annuitants.  For example, moving from a real single 
life annuity with no bequest provision to a real joint and full survivor annuity with a 20-year 
period certain would reduce the monthly income from the annuity by nearly 24%.  If a goal of an 
individual accounts system is to ensure a level of monthly income that is no lower than would be 
available under the current OASI system, as suggested by Feldstein et al (1999), the use of a 
joint-and-full-survivor annuity with a 20 year certain option would require a 24% increase in the 
annual contribution rate over the rate required with a single life annuity.          
 All of these results are based upon purely financial considerations, such as the expected 
present value of payments received.  These measures do not capture the utility gains associated 
with the longevity insurance component of annuities, which life cycle simulations indicate may   47 
be quite substantial.  In order to embed the distributional analysis into a utility framework, 
additional work is needed in at least two areas.  First, further research is needed into the 
differences, if any, in utility parameters such as risk aversion across demographic groups.  
Second, additional work is required to adequately parameterize the utility of bequest function.  
Both of these issues are largely unresolved in the existing literature.  Another avenue for future 
research is in better understanding the underlying determinants of the large mortality differentials 
that we observe across racial, gender, and economic lines.     48 
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TABLE 1 
Conditional Life Expectancy by Gender, Race, Hispanic Status, and Education 
 
Conditional Life Expectancy 
 at age 22 
Conditional Life Expectancy 
 at age 67 
 
Men Women  Men  Women 
        
All 77.4  83.4  83.5  87.2 
        
All Whites  78.3  84.0  83.6  87.4 
All Blacks  71.8  80.0  82.3  86.1 
All Hispanics  77.4  85.2  83.5  88.3 
        
Whites:  College +  80.5  85.1  84.4  87.8 
Whites:  HS +  77.8  83.9  83.4  87.3 
Whites:  < HS  75.3  82.1  82.3  86.5 
       
Blacks:  College +  75.7  81.9  83.4  86.8 
Blacks:  HS +  71.6  80.0  82.2  86.1 
Blacks:  < HS  68.1  77.5  81.0  85.1 
  
Notes:  “Conditional Life Expectancy” is used to describe the age to which an individual can expect to live, 
conditional on attaining age 22 or 67. 
 
Source:  Author’s calculations as described in text. 
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TABLE 2 
Expected Bequests by Gender, Race, Hispanic Status and Education (Men Only) 
 
Cumulative Probability of Bequest by Age   Ratio  of 
Mean 
AIME 






             
All  1.000  0.012 0.035 0.064 0.120 0.200  $8,306  1.000 
             
All  Whites  1.058  0.009 0.027 0.053 0.105 0.182  $8,178  0.985 
All  Blacks  0.696  0.033 0.087 0.141 0.224 0.323  $8,504  1.024 
All  Hispanics  0.714  0.012 0.035 0.064 0.120 0.200  $5,933  0.714 
             
Whites:  Coll.  + 1.111  0.007 0.021 0.037 0.073 0.131  $6,197  0.746 
Whites:    HS  +  1.066  0.009 0.029 0.056 0.112 0.193  $8,776  1.057 
Whites:    <  HS  0.965  0.011 0.037 0.075 0.149 0.249 $10,205  1.229 
             
Blacks:    Coll.  + 0.864  0.027 0.064 0.098 0.154 0.230  $7,512  0.904 
Blacks:    HS  +  0.733  0.033 0.087 0.142 0.227 0.328  $9,111  1.097 
Blacks:    <  HS  0.624  0.040 0.111 0.185 0.294 0.412  $9,651  1.162 
 
Notes: 
AIME Ratio is the ratio of the mean value of Average Indexed Monthly Earnings for men in each group to the mean 
AIME of the entire male population as calculated from the Health and Retirement Survey.  Cumulative probability 
of bequest is the probability that an individual dies before the age shown, conditional on being alive at age 22.  
EPDV of bequest is the expected discounted value of bequests calculated using equation 5 in text.  The discount rate 
is 3% (r=.03), individual accounts consist of 6% of earnings (α =.06), annual earnings at age 22 (l22) are $30,000 
times the AIME ratio, and earnings grow at an annual real rate of 1% (g=.01).  “Ratio of EPDV of Bequest” is the 
ratio of the EPDV of bequests for each group to that of all men.  
 
Source:  Authors calculations as described in text.   52 
 
TABLE 3 
Money’s Worth of Real and Nominal Individual Annuities 
 
 Real  Annuity 
r = .03 
Real Annuity 
r = .06 
Nominal Annuity 
r = π  = .03 
MEN     
  All  0.920  0.937  0.938 
      
  All Whites  0.927  0.943  0.944 
  All Blacks  0.862  0.885  0.886 
  All Hispanics  0.920  0.937  0.938 
    
  Whites:  College +  0.967  0.979  0.980 
  Whites:  HS +  0.916  0.933  0.934 
  Whites:  < HS  0.865  0.888  0.889 
      
  Blacks:  College +  0.916  0.935  0.935 
  Blacks:  HS +  0.857  0.880  0.881 
  Blacks:  < HS  0.800  0.829  0.830 
      
WOMEN     
  All  1.076  1.060  1.059 
      
  All Whites  1.084  1.067  1.067 
  All Blacks  1.022  1.011  1.011 
  All Hispanics  1.123  1.097  1.097 
      
  Whites:  College +  1.106  1.086  1.086 
  Whites:  HS +  1.080  1.063  1.063 
  Whites:  < HS  1.044  1.031  1.031 
      
  Blacks:  College +  1.055  1.041  1.041 
  Blacks:  HS +  1.022  1.012  1.011 
  Blacks:  < HS  0.976  0.970  0.970 
Source:  Author’s calculations as described in text 
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TABLE 4 
Initial Monthly Income from Annuities 
  Real Life Annuity  Real Annuity + 10 PC  Real Annuity + 20 PC 
Real (r=.03)  $621.25  $586.11  $503.35 
Nominal (r=.03, π =.03)  $808.86 $759.92  $669.29 




Money’s Worth of Period Certain Annuity Products 
Real Annuity + 10 PC  Real Annuity + 20 PC   Real  Life 
Annuity  µ  = 1  µ  = 0  µ  =1  µ  = 0 
       
MEN       
  All  0.920  0.936  0.868  0.972  0.745 
       
  All Whites  0.927  0.940  0.874  0.973  0.751 
  All Blacks  0.862  0.900  0.813  0.964  0.698 
  All Hispanics  0.920  0.936  0.868  0.972  0.745 
        
  Whites:  College +  0.967  0.965  0.912  0.978  0.783 
  Whites:  HS +  0.916  0.934  0.864  0.973  0.742 
  Whites:  < HS  0.865  0.900  0.816  0.964  0.701 
       
  Blacks:  College +  0.916  0.932  0.864  0.970  0.742 
  Blacks:  HS +  0.857  0.897  0.808  0.964  0.694 
  Blacks:  < HS  0.800  0.861  0.754  0.955  0.648 
       
WOMEN       
  All  1.076  1.061  1.015  1.026  0.872 
       
  All Whites  1.084  1.066  1.023  1.027  0.879 
  All Blacks  1.022  1.025  0.964  1.018  0.828 
  All Hispanics  1.123  1.097  1.060  1.042  0.910 
       
  Whites:  College +  1.106  1.080  1.043  1.030  0.896 
  Whites:  HS +  1.080  1.063  1.019  1.027  0.875 
  Whites:  < HS  1.044  1.040  0.985  1.022  0.846 
       
  Blacks:  College +  1.055  1.046  0.995  1.023  0.855 
  Blacks:  HS +  1.022  1.025  0.964  1.018  0.828 
  Blacks:  < HS  0.976  0.996  0.920  1.011  0.790 
Notes:  µ  represents the relative value of $1 in an estate relative to the value of $1 in income to the insured 
individual.   
 
Source:  Author’s calculations as described in text.   54 
 
TABLE 6 
Money’s Worth of Joint and Survivor Annuities 
 
Real Annuity + 10 PC  Real Annuity + 20 PC   Real  Life 
Annuity  µ  = 1  µ  = 0  µ  =1  µ  = 0 
100% Survivor 
Benefits 
     
  All  1.000  1.000  0.994  1.000  0.944 
       
  All Whites  1.004  1.004  0.998  1.001  0.948 
  All Blacks  0.967  0.971  0.961  0.989  0.912 
  All Hispanics  1.021  1.020  1.014  1.012  0.963 
       
  Whites:  College +  1.019  1.016  1.012  1.005  0.961 
  Whites:  HS +  1.001  1.001  0.995  1.001  0.945 
  Whites:  < HS  0.975  0.978  0.969  0.992  0.920 
       
  Blacks:  College +  0.991  0.992  0.985  0.996  0.935 
  Blacks:  HS +  0.966  0.970  0.960  0.989  0.912 
  Blacks:  < HS  0.932  0.941  0.926  0.979  0.879 
       
50% Survivor 
Benefits 
     
  All  1.000  1.000  0.943  1.000  0.809 
       
  All Whites  1.008  1.008  0.950  1.001  0.815 
  All Blacks  0.944  0.964  0.890  0.992  0.764 
  All Hispanics  1.024  1.018  0.965  1.008  0.828 
        
  Whites:  College +  1.038  1.024  0.979  1.005  0.840 
  Whites:  HS +  1.000  1.000  0.943  1.001  0.809 
  Whites:  < HS  0.956  0.971  0.902  0.993  0.774 
       
  Blacks:  College +  0.987  0.991  0.931  0.997  0.799 
  Blacks:  HS +  0.941  0.963  0.888  0.992  0.762 
  Blacks:  < HS  0.889  0.930  0.839  0.984  0.720 
 
Source:  Author’s calculations as described in text. 
   55 
TABLE 7 
Probability of Surviving from Age 67 to Age 77 
 
  Survival Probability from Age 67 to 77 
 Men  Women 
    
All 0.744  0.828 
    
All Whites  0.751  0.836 
All Blacks  0.688  0.779 
All Hispanics  0.744  0.857 
    
Whites:  College +  0.791  0.856 
Whites:  HS +  0.739  0.832 
Whites:  < HS  0.693  0.799 
    
Blacks:  College +  0.744  0.810 
Blacks:  HS +  0.682  0.779 
Blacks:  < HS  0.628  0.736 
 






Monthly Income from $100,000 Policy if Priced Based on Group Specific Mortality 
 
 Monthly  Income 
 Men  Women 
    
All $675.36  $577.36 
    
All Whites  670.42  572.90 
All Blacks  720.83  608.15 
All Hispanics  675.36  553.08 
    
Whites:  College +  642.73  561.83 
Whites:  HS +  678.25  575.13 
Whites:  < HS  718.40  595.19 
    
Blacks:  College +  678.22  589.01 
Blacks:  HS +  725.13  608.01 
Blacks:  < HS  776.92  636.84 
 
Source:  Author’s calculations as described in text 
 